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uncertain, fuzzy and also unavailable surroundings. They are "shadows", 
names on "gravestones", echoes of a larger existence that spills over as 
their very own halo. 
Perhaps the most appropriate metaphor for the fragments of a thinker 
long gone is that of sound. What perceptible truth remains can be thought 
of as a sound that once carried a precise meaning made up of space, time, 
landscapes, language - in a word, life .. And yet, what is left as a fragment 
is not life, but a sound the resounding of which is the form we give to it 
"now". How could philology, the life of language turned back upon itself, 
its rewound history, regain the totality of a whole life to us? It may perhaps 
bring forward other parts, other sounds, other shadows of the whole. The 
whole as such remains concealed, but in remaining so it "releases us", in 
the words of Fink, "to the matter that merits being named the matter of 
thinking."9 Similarly, the concealed past releases us to the matter that 
merits being named the matter of memory and relates it to the matter of 
life. 
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Creativity and Personality 
We know a surprising amount about the nature of individual creativity. 
During the twentieth century, the empirical cognitive psychology of 
creation established a comprehensive list of attributes of creative 
personalities.1 As a result, we can say with some confidence that creative 
individuals are a mirror of the nature of creation. Creation is best described 
as a union of opposites. This is its most enduring hallmark. Creative 
personalities are literal embodiments of this universal trait of creative 
action. They are often walking contradictions. They combine enthusiastic 
energies with the capacity for quiet concentration. They are predictive and 
insightful while displaying narve, even credulous, wonderment at things. 
They are playful but disciplined, imaginative but grounded, responsible and 
irresponsible in turns. They mix extroverted and introverted, sociable and 
anti-social traits. Creative individuals are often lacking in courtesies and 
social manners, yet have close long-term intellectual friends and peers to 
whom they relate on the most generous and intimate terms. 
About their own work, they are both humble and proud. They treat it 
with enthusiastic reverence and dispassionate, even brutal, objectivity. 
They are persons of wide interests and expansive curiosities yet they are 
persistent, even obsessive, about pursuing defined intellectual goals. 
Creative personalities are adventurous, even thrill-seeking, but for a point. 
At the highest level, "the point" is to bridge apparently unbridgeable 
divides. The ambition, say, to unify Einstein's theory of relativity with 
quantum mechanics is a classic case in point. Creative personalities are 
persistent in the face of the "it can't be done" response to the difficult, even 
recalcitrant, nature of creative problem-solving. Persistence, translated into 
social situations, can take the shape of stubbornness and uncooperativeness 
- and the working of long, anti-social hours. Persistence in creation 
requires mental discipline, concentration, and focus. The flipside of this 
1 This tradition is epitomised by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Creativity Flow a11d the Psychology of 
D1scovery and Invention (New York: HarperCollins, 1996). 
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concentration is forgetfulness. The memory that drives creation is so often 
forgetful. 
It is not uncommon that creative personalities are also careless and 
disorganised about whatever they are not working on. Yet about matters 
that command their attention they always have a profound sense of order. 
For intuitions of order are the way in which the unbridgeable is bridged and 
unions are created out of opposites. Ordering and creating are analogous 
actions. Ordering, it must be stressed, is not the same thing as rule-making 
or rule-following. Creative personalities are interested in order, not in rules. 
Rules are a by-product of order, but they are not a substitute for order. 
Often rules create the chaos or the inertness that high-level creative order 
overcomes. Creative personalities have a great tolerance for complexity 
and ambiguity. But they don't regard either complexity or ambiguity as a 
social or cognitive ideal. Their motto is "keep it simple". Order is a kind of 
simplicity. Order eliminates chaos. It lends the materials of the world an 
elegant and lucid structure. Creative persons are at home with complex 
intrigues and baroque labyrinths. But this is because they can see emergent 
patterns where most individuals only see murk. While they are at home 
with complexity, they delight in simplicity and parsimonious structure. 
Creative individuals, as a type, tell us something about the nature of 
creation. What they excel at is unifying what is divergent, and harmonising 
what is dissonant. This displays even in sexual orientation. Creative 
personalities tend to a kind of androgyny. The impulse to unify opposites 
also displays in their humour. They are often very witty. This is no 
accident. Humour works because it combines opposites. The punch line of 
a joke takes you to the opposite place you expected. Indeed, it often takes 
you to a place you didn't want to go, and you smile all the while. Where 
the "logical mind" sees a contradiction between, say, the vertical and the 
horizontal, the quick-witted mind sees them as a "whole" not bound by 
discursive logic but by the unifying force of opposition. The connection 
between the opposites A and X is not simply an analogy (A is like B, X is 
similar to Y) but rather A in some ways is X. If adhesives are equated with 
strength, the creative mind says "let us try a weak adhesive". The notion of 
a "weak adhesive" sounds at first take to be a contradiction in terms but it 
is exactly ''the power to connect the (seemingly) un-connectable" that 
constitutes the power of creation. 
While we understand much about the nature of individual creativity, we 
still understand little about the role of creation on a collective level - that 
is, creativity as an emergent property of large-scale social systems. This is 
despite the very evident fact that creativity clusters in specific historical 
times and social spaces. Put simply, certain societies in certain historical 
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periods are exceptionally creative. The principal examples i~ history have 
been ancient Greece, Renaissance Florence and Venice, the Ile-de-France, 
the Low Countries, Southern England since the Renaissance, the Scottish 
Lowlands in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nineteenth-century 
riverine Europe, and the various Seaboards of the United States.2 These 
societies, in their golden epochs, are responsible for most of the human 
species' artistic, literary, political, economic, scientific, and technological 
inventiveness. They are, quite literally, amazing times and places. 
Because inventiveness clusters in this way, it is also quite evident that 
creation is not just an individual attribute. Indeed, there is good reason to 
think that individual creativity, no matter how impressive, leans heavily on 
collective social creativity. There are exceptional individuals with high 
levels of innovative capacity but these exceptional individuals also cluster 
in a remarkably small number of times and places. How can we explain 
this? 
Collective Creation 
The most important attempt to date to explain the collective scale of 
creation is that of Cornelius Castoriadis - the leading Modem Greek 
philosopher.3 Castoriadis' contribution to the theory of collective creation 
can be summarised thus:4 
2 More recently, the Japanese archipelago and the Australasian littoral have shown distinct signs of 
joining these historic leaders. For a quantitative historiometric analysis of key locations of innovation in 
the arts and sciences, see Charles Murray, Human Accompltshment The Pursuit of Excellence rn the Arts 
and Sciences, 800 B.C. to 1950 (New York: HarperCollins, 2003). The term "riverine Europe" is an 
allusion to four key post-1800 centres of creative achievement: a) the triangular region bounded by the 
Elbe and Salle Rivers that includes the cities ofFreiburg, Jena, Halle, Bayreuth, Weimar and Prague; b) 
another triangular region bounded by the Maas (Meuse) and Rhine Rivers that includes the city of 
Cologne; c) the triangular area of Baden-WUrttemberg bounded by the Rhine and Danube Rivers that has 
Stuttgart at its centre and that converges at its southern tip on Zurich; d) the line of the Danube that 
stretches between Budapest and Vienna and into Bavaria. As Murray notes (p. 356), cities like Prague, 
Munich, Vienna, Cologne and Stuttgart produced a huge concentration of highly creative talent after 
1800. Their geographical settings have distinct parallels with the older creative node, the ile-de-France, 
the inland peninsula that is delimited by the Oise, Seine, Ourcq and Marne rivers, which has Paris at its 
heart 
3 For a overview ofCastoriadis' life, politics and philosophy, see Peter Murphy, "Cornelius Castoriadis" 
in George Ritzer (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Social Theory Volume I (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005), pp. 
82-83. 
4 See in particular, Cornelius Castoriadis, "The Social-Historical: Mode of Being, Problems of 
Knowledge" (1987), "Individual, Society, Rationality, History" (1987-1988), "Power, Politics, 
Autonomy" (1978-1988) in David Ames Curtis ( ed.), Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); "The Institution of Society and Religion" (1978-1980), "Phusis and Autonomy" 
(1986) and "Time and Creation" (1983) in David Ames Curtis (ed. and trans.), World m Fragments. 
wrztings on politics, society, psychoanalysiS, and the 1magmatwn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1997); "Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary" (1994) and "Culture in a 
Democratic Society" (1991-1994) in David Ames Curtis (ed. and trans.), The Castoriad1s Reader 
(Oxford; Cambndge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997). 
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Societies create themselves. They emerge in collective acts of creation 
from chaos. They give themselves form or shape - from which norms and 
rules are derived. Castoriadis called this self-organisation and self-
legislation "autonomy". 
- Having created themselves, most societies arrest the process of 
creation. They replace the autonomy of self-organisation and self-
legislation with heteronomous behaviour. They ascribe their creation 
to extra-social or transcendental sources. In other words, most 
societies create themselves as un-creative societies - whose forms are 
more or less fixed. 
- Heteronomous societies reproduce themselves through the repetition, 
recurrence and equivalence of their forms. 
- A small handful of societies have an unusual form: a form calibrated 
to creating forms. Castoriadis called these societies "autonomous". 
- All of these autonomous societies belong in the slipstream of Greco-
Western history. They include the ancient polis, the Renaissance city-
states, the burgher cities of Europe, and the American Republic.5 
On this account then, creation is a collective process that operates on the 
largest social scale imaginable. All societies are formed through acts of 
creation - no matter how occulted such acts might be or might become. At 
the same time, collective creation as a permanent rather than arrested 
process is very rare, and is typical of only a small handful of societies in 
history. 
All ofthis is of more than casual interest because, since around 1820 (at 
the point when the industrial revolution became institutionalised), social 
success, indeed social viability, has become massively linked to permanent 
innovation in the arts and the sciences, the humanities and technologies. 
The cost now of not having permanent creation in economies and polities -
and in integrative and technological systems - is to live a kind of collective 
social death in a way that is historically unprecedented. Castoriadis was at 
pains to point out that much about the condition of "permanent innovation" 
is illusory. Most "creative" formation in practice is derivative. It is an 
elaboration of, or inference from, one or other existing social patterns. In 
contrast, the most far-reaching kinds of innovation suppose the social 
ability to generate forms that are not produced or deduced from pre-
existing patterns. Thus, in practice, what is "original" or "innovative" is 
mostly an extrapolation or derivation. Such derivation creates "difference" 
but, as Castoriadis put it, not the "alterity" or "otherness" typical of 
5 Castoriadis frequently made allusions to the constituents of this list-a list which is remarkably close to 
that of Charles Murray's empirically·derived inventory of creative places (in Human Accomplishment), 
though Castoriadis' geography of creation understandably is not as minutely detailed as Murray's. 
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maximal creation - creation that is not derivative.6 A technological or 
aesthetic form that is rationally deducible from an existing form may 
appear "different" from the social form that inspired it but, at the end of the 
day, it is still determined by that inspirational form. With the passage of 
time, this becomes very obvious. 
To make sense of the distinction between derivation and creation, 
Castoriadis insisted on the existence of radical, that is, un-determined or a-
causal, creation.7 This is the least compelling aspect of his theory of social 
creation. It is unconvincing because it is untrue. As we'll see shortly, the 
human imagination has available to it a common stock of form-generating 
media that play a crucial role in the determination of social forms. These 
form-generating intermediaries are not media in the sense of tone or stone-
that is, materials that convey meanings. Yet they are not full-fledged social 
forms either, in the sense that the sonata form or the Greek temple form, 
the republican form or the feudal form are. Rather, form-generating media 
lie half-way between the sensuousness of materials and the meaningfulness 
of explicit forms. Proportion and harmony are examples of such media. 
They shape tone and stone into recognisable, transmittable and 
reproducible forms. But they are not actually forms themselves. 
Neither are they discourses or arguments, or parts of syllogisms. While 
his thesis of a-causality gives creativity an undeserved romantic 
colouration, Castoriadis is on much surer ground when he criticises 
rationalist illusions that equate the genesis of social forms with 
communicative reasoning or discursive interaction. Castoriadis was 
sceptical of claims that reason is capable of positing or revamping the 
forms of society. The many delirious follies of intellectuals suggest such 
scepticism is warranted.8 From the Jacobins to Pol Pot and Sayyid Qutb, 
their behaviour over multiple centuries has turned numerous societies into 
6 This is the "irreducibly new", the "radical alterity" of creation See "The Institution of Society and 
Religion" and "Time and Creation" in World in Fragments, p. 320 and p. 329. 
7 "Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary" and "Culture in a Democratic Society" in 
The Castoriad1s Reader, p. 322. 
8 Castoriadis was unswervingly critical of the endless procession of intellectuals who identified with 
despotic and murderous regimes. In one very typical passage, he observed the magnetic appeal that even 
the creepiest kinds of "revolutionary power" had for intellectuals of his generation. Whenever one of 
these ugly powers appeared, "[then] begins the golden-age offellow-travellers, who were able to afford 
the luxury of an apparently intransigent opposition to a part of reality-reality 'at home'-by paying for 
it with the glorification of another part of this reality-over there, elsewhere, in Russia, in China, in Cuba, 
in Algeria, in Vietnam, or, if worst came to worst, in Albania. Rare are those among the great names in 
the Western intelligentsia who have not, at some moment between 1920 and 1970, made this "sacrifice of 
conscience", sometimes (the least often) in the most infantile kind of credulity, other times (most often) 
with the most paltry sort of trickery. Sartre, stating in a menacing tone: 'You cannot discuss what Stalin is 
doing, smce he alone has the information that explains his motives', will remain, no doubt, the most 
instructive specimen of the intellectual's tendency to look ridiculous." ("Intellectuals and History" (1987) 
in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 10.) 
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charnel houses. As Castoriadis points out, reasoning rests on non-linguistic 
presuppositions. Thus, the first terms of any discourse are intuitive and 
figurative. They are the products ofnous, not logos. The intellectual's vice 
is to think that logos can do the work of no us .9 But discourse left to itself is 
pitiless and destructive. Logical language, disconnected from figurative 
nous, is a violent medium. The way discursive logic moves, from premise 
to conclusion, is ruthless and implacable. For sure, as Castoriadis remarks, 
this is not physical violence, but it is very destructive all the same. To stand 
in the way of the logical torrent is to risk being swept aside. To question 
the premises of torrential discourse is to risk excommunication - and 
worse. In this manner, rationalist discourse "inevitably destroys discourse 
itself''. 10 Once this happens, it is actually a short step for the violence of 
discourse to be replaced by the force of arms. 
Castoriadis equates "reason" with communicative or discursive reason -
the logician's reason. II When he talks about reason, he means chains of 
reasons that rest on discursive principles and that are logically organised. 
The nature of such reasoning is distinct from the intuitive-figurative nature 
of social forms. Forms precede words. Of course, once in existence, forms 
can be represented by language - i.e. they can be put into words and turned 
into the premise of an argument or discourse. Implications can be derived 
from such premises. But the problem with this is that, while reasoning is 
logico-deductive, form creation is not. 
New forms emerge through images, not words.12 This was one of 
Castoriadis' most important conclusions. New forms emerge from society's 
collective aural, visual and haptic-tactile imaging. The work of the 
imagination does not just represent "what is absent". It also posits objects 
that otherwise would not exist. This occurs in the first place through the 
making of an image of the object. This is an act of figuration: the "positing 
of figures and the relations between and to these figures" .13 The creative or 
radical imagination, capable of bringing into being the image of something 
that has not existed before, does so by positing figures or models.14 
9 Castoriadis, The Jmagrnary Institution ojSoc1ety, trans. Kathleen Blarney (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1987 [first published 1975]), p. 350. 
1° Castoriadis, The Imaginary Instztution ojSoc1ety, p. 350. 
11 Castoriadis, "Logic, Imagination, Reflection", World in Fragments, p. 256, p. 265. 
12 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 321, p. 329; "Logic, Imagination, Reflection", 
World in Fragments (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 258. Castoriadis remarks 
" ... abstract thought itselfalways has to lean on some figure or image, be it, minimally the image of the 
words through which it is carried on". "Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary", in The 
Castoriadis Reader, p. 329. Elsewhere he observes that radical imagination involves "the incessant 
emergence of the other in and through the positing (Vor-stellung) of images or figures ... " Cornelius 
Castoriadis, The Imaginary institution of Society, p. 329. 
13 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 204. 
14 Castoriadis, "Logic, Imagination, Reflection", World in Fragments, p. 269. 
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Although these models and figures may be represented by words, they are 
not created by words. 
This principle applies as much to works and objects whose materials are 
primarily linguistic in nature as it does to any other kind of human creation. 
As classical rhetoric theorists understood, the good use of language 
depends on taxis (arrangement). Taxis allows speakers and writers to 
communicate through figures. Figures of speech are a resonance of figures 
of thought. They share structural characteristics and semantic architecture 
in common. Classical rhetoric stressed that schemas of balance, repetition, 
word order, presence and omission, and proportion are key aspects of this 
architecture. Great speakers and writers are masters of such schemas. They 
build their words using repetitions of alliteration, assonance and 
anadiplosis. They orchestrate plateaus and climaxes. They balance phrases 
and clauses, make calculated omissions (ellipsis), and create flexible word 
orders (parenthesis). Speakers understate and writers exaggerate - they 
play with the proportions of words and the (dis)proportionate relation of 
words to things and events. Most interesting of all is the kind of word 
architecture that creates relations between things that are seemingly 
unrelated. Metaphor and simile are classic ways of doing this. So is the 
drawing of comparisons or the arranging words and phrases in opposition. 
There is also a taxis of stacking that allows for the creation of orders of 
superior and inferior, higher and lower, genus and species. Words, like 
tones and stones, also can be turned upside down. When we invert words, 
we create relations of irony and paradox. Whatever the techniques used, 
and however they are deployed, the overall power of words depends on the 
underlying taxis. 
Taxis provides incipient structure for visible and audible words. Taxis 
arises in the imagination. Hence Castoriadis' view that linguistic-type 
axioms, criteria and rules are suspended in acts of imagination. 15 They are 
suspended by being over-determined by figures, models, and diagrams.16 
Figures, models, and diagrams are the common media of taxis. On an 
individual and collective social level, figuration occurs through the 
imagination's power of organisation. Correspondingly, this power of 
15 Castoriadis, "Logic, Imagination, Reflection", World m Fragments, p. 268. 
16 The great English mathematician Roger Penrose observes in the concluding parts of his The Emperor's 
New Mmd: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics (Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999 [first publishedl989]), pp. 541-550, that the most creative thought is non-verbal. 
At the highest levels of insight, the sense of beauty plays the crucial role in thought. Penrose cites the 
self-reflections of Albert Einstein ("The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem 
to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical elements which seem to serve as elements of 
thought ... are, in my case, of visual and some muscular type."), the geneticist Francis Galton ("1... waste 
a vast deal of time in seeking appropriate words and phrases ... "), and the mathematician Jacques 
Hadamard ("I insist that words are totally absent from my mind when I really think ... "). Penrose says of 
himself: "Almost all my mathematical thinking is done visually and in terms of non-verbal concepts " 
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arrangement operates through figures that take shape via the imagination's 
mastery of form-generating media like hierarchy, balance, parallelism, 
repetition, similarity, and proportion. The formation of an image involves 
the positing of elements and the bringing of those elements into a relation.17 
Whether the material is tone or stone, words or the physical matter of the 
universe, form-generating media play a crucial role in all kinds of creation. 
This account of the emergence of forms through non-linguistic 
organising media parallels certain conceptions of the pre-Socratics from 
Greek antiquity. The pre-Socratics recognised that whatever it is that brings 
contrary pairings into a meaningful relationship permits the generation of 
order out of chaos.18 The impetus toward such pairings is a force, phusis, 
built into the universe and mirrored in the human mind. Phusis is the force 
of organisation that creates lucid, sustainable, contrary pairings of 
elements. How does it do this? Already observed in Greek antiquity was 
the key role that abstract media - like rhythm, balance, equilibrium, 
proportion, harmony, and symmetry - play in the manufacture of order out 
of chaos. These form-producing media, when mobilised, function as 
powers that bring otherwise unconnected elements into a relationship that 
constitutes meaning. In doing so, these powers create objects, and amongst 
them social objects. 
Castoriadis distanced himself from the pre-Socratic account of creation 
in one very crucial respect, though. Its notion of contrary pairings was a-
historical. It set the stage for Plato's assertion that forms are unchanging. 
Castoriadis instead veered very close to Plotinus' view of a universe of 
forms involved in a constant activity of morphogenesis. In Castoriadis' 
eyes, a universe of structural pairs was a universe of spatial "difference" 
rather than temporal "otherness". It did not distinguish spatial line from 
temporal line. Repeatedly, he stressed that time was a key dimension of the 
radical imaginary of creation. His social physics was relativistic in 
Einstein's sense. Time was the crucial medium in which "other" figures 
emerged. It was an indispensable medium for the "otherness-alteration" of 
these figures. 19 
Nous and Logos 
The history of Greek-Western thought can be divided into two strands. One 
is pre-Socratic. The other is Socratic. The pre-Socratics judged that what 
was most fundamental in the world was non-discursive. Socrates 
17 Castoriadis, "Logic, Imagination, Reflection", World in Fragments, p. 259. 
18 That makes a pair out of what otherwise has no relationship or else simply an accidental relationship. 
19 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 193. 
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considered that what was most fundamental was speech and argument. One 
can think of this as the difference between nous and logos. In the dominant 
strains of philosophical thought since the seventeenth century, Socratic 
discursiveness trumped the pre-Socratics. This was so even though the oral 
spontaneity of Socratic speech gave way to the congealed language of "the 
book" as the principal mode of discourse.20 
· There have always been dissenters of course - those who challenged the 
presumptive primacy of discourse (Hobbes was a notable critic). But, 
especially through the twentieth century, the idea that language was the 
principal medium for the generation of social relations was dominant in 
social self-understanding. Many philosophers - ranging from Mead and 
Dewey to Heidegger and Habermas- endorsed this view. The upshot was 
the vast over-estimation of the objectivating power of discursive language, 
and at the same time the underestimation of how important the making of 
objects, including social objects, is to knowledge.21 Discursive reason in 
itself cannot create objects. It cannot do this because by its very nature it 
cannot posit the non-verbal patterned forms around which social objects 
coalesce. Reason can explore the implications of objects - or rather the 
implications of statements we make that represent those objects. But even 
this has its limits. 
Words are not very good at representing objects - let alone at positing 
them. This is why the early Wittgenstein thought that any hope for logic lay 
in picture languages - which was a good intuition.22 Non-figurative 
languages misrepresent as much as represent social objects. Discourse is 
often touted as a therapy for this. The propositional statements that we 
make about objects can be subjected to discursive treatment - ending in 
falsification or verification. Yet these discourses, while sometimes 
impressive, are often very inadequate. We can make deductions from, 
inferences about, and establish analogical relations amongst propositions. 
But discursive reason rests on the law of non-contradiction. If I accept that 
law, then I am bound to accept that my statements should not contradict the 
principles (the major premises, in effect) that I rely on. This, however, tells 
me nothing about the coming-into-being or invention of these principles -
such as the "self-evident truths" of the American Declaration of 
Independence. Such invention is an act of creation that occurs through 
aural rhythms, visual pictures, and plastic-haptic shapes - that is, through 
images not words. The very expression, "self-evident truths", betrays this. 
20 This happened when printing made the production and distribution of the book so cheap and easy. 
21 On this, see Peter Murphy, "Communication and Self-Organization", Southem Review, vol. 37, no. 3 
(2005). 
22 Peter Murphy and David Roberts, Dzalectic of Romanticism· A Critique of Modernism (London and 
New York. Continuum, 2004), pp. 127-136 
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Self-evidence is the evidence of the eyes. We see these principles. We see 
them before we say them. In such "vision", we grasp the shape - the 
outline- of a social form. We construct social forms through visual-spatial, 
bodily-kinetic, plastic-mathematical, and aural-musical cues.23 
In the most far-reaching cases, such acts of creation suppose the 
emergence of what Castoriadis called "alterity" or "otherness". His account 
of this, though, rested on an intellectual tension. On the one hand, he 
argued that such acts, and their resulting forms, were un-determined. They 
were generated "out of nothing". On the other hand, he maintained that 
they were products of the imagination - formed through acts of figuration. 
This latter implied that the crucible of creation was not "nothing" but a 
process with explicable - though not discursive - painterly, aesthetic, 
diagrammatical, graphical, and like qualities. 
When Castoriadis spoke of forms arising "out of nothing", his clear 
intent was to preclude any thought that there was only a limited number of 
social forms. He contended that in history - that is, in social time - new 
forms emerge that are incommensurable with any prior existing forms. Put 
simply, modem bureaucratic capitalism does not emerge out of feudalism, 
even iffeudalism precedes it chronologically. The process of History is not 
like a logical argument. Contra Hegel, History is not Reason. New forms 
may mean the appearance of new discursive principles - but discursive 
principles do not create new forms. Creation is figurative. In historical 
time, there is a first tribe, a first bureaucracy, and a first sonata. These are 
things that previously had not been conceived, and thus could not have 
been logically deduced. 
The ABA form of the sonata is figurative, not discursive. At the core of 
feudalism and bureaucracy is the picture of a hierarchy. In one case it is a 
personal hierarchy, in the other case a procedural hierarchy. This begs the 
question, though: where do such figures come from? Castoriadis described 
creation as a process of figuration figuring itselr.Z4 While this description 
has a certain dramatic quality, it is circular, and thus not particularly 
explanatory. Nonetheless it supposes one very important thing: namely that 
new forms appear through some kind of a figurative medium. What is this 
medium like? Well, argued Castoriadis, it is not impressionable material. 
The emergence of forms is not determined by sense impressions of 
23 For this reason, then, Castoriadis' insistence that the imagination is the capac tty to posit an image 
"starting from nothing at all" is wrong. See Castoriadis, "Logic, Imagination, Reflection", World in 
Fragments, p. 269. 
24 "The social-historical is radical imaginary, namely the incessant originality of otherness that figures, 
and figures itself, is in figuring and in figuring itself, giving itself as a figure and figuring itself to the 
second degree." Castoriadis, The Imagmary Institution of Society, p. 204 
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something that already exists.25 Neither does figuration "refer" to an extant 
world or object. It is not denotative. But neither is it symbolic.26 Figures 
don't "stand for" something else that already exists. So, if figuration is not 
impressionable, referential or symbolic, then what is it? Having dismissed 
impression, denotation and symbolism, Castoriadis concludes that 
figuration is the generation of purely circular meanings of social 
signification/7 and, as such, figuration figuring itself must start "from 
th. "28 no mg. 
Castoriadis acknowledged that existing forms condition the emergence 
of new forms.29 But what he also supposed was the incommensurable 
nature of forms - their radical "otherness". This meant that their genesis, of 
logical necessity, is anchored in nothingness. If forms are 
incommensurable, then they must be un-determined. Forms thus emerge in 
the passage from nothingness to being. 30 How can something that is 
determinate apparently not have determinations? How can something that 
comes into existence not be deducible from something else that already 
exists? 
Castoriadis' theory actually provides an implicit answer to these 
questions. As already noted, he stressed how important "figures" of the 
imagination are to creative action. If we take this one step further, we can 
avoid the difficulties posed by the idea of creation "out of nothing" without 
relinquishing any of the more compelling aspects of Castoriadis' theory. If 
we suppose that - both individually and collectively - the imagination is 
composed of form-generating media, then we do not have to assume that 
there is any numeric limit on the number of forms ever to be posited. Yet, 
at the same time, we do not have to assume either that forms appear "out of 
nothing". Rather, and more simply, they are brought into being by the 
figurative media of the nous. This is not a discursive process. There exist 
"graphic" words of course - those forged, for instance, by rhyme or accent 
schemes - that conjure up images, just as shapes exist in music, and reason 
can be the attribute of an action or a person's character, not just of their 
25 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Instltutzon of Society, p. 30 I. 
26 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 143. 
27 Circularity-the circle-it should be noted in passing is a commonly recurnng social geometry, and 
one that we find, for example in the Renaissance, that is often invoked against hierarchical figuration. On 
the circle in Renaissance figurative politics, see Peter Murphy, Cil'ic Justice From Anczent Greece to the 
Modern World(Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2001), p 177. 
28 Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, p. 300. 
29 "Time and Creation" in World m Fragments, p 392, p 397; "Radical Imagination and the Soctal 
Instituting Imaginary" in The Castorzadzs Reader, p. 322. Castoriadis observes that "this creation is ex 
nzhilo ... 'Creation ex mhilo' ... does not mean creation 'cum nih1lo', that is to say, without 'means', 
unconditionally, on a tabula rasa." "Individual, Society, Rationality, History" in Philosophy, Pol!tzcs, 
Autonomy, p. 64. 
10 ''The Institution of Society and Religion" in World m Fragments, p. 321. 
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words. But the imagination is not structured like an argument, a dialogue, a 
conversation, logical reasoning, or any other discursive utterance. 
Reasoning is a linguistic phenomenon, and it is in the realm of 
discursive reason that we see the manifest limit of words. All language-
based models of society fall foul of this limit. There is no way of them 
escaping such limits. There is no linguistic solvent for them. This means 
that a "rational society" based on collective discursive competence cannot 
posit its own foundations. Reasoning, no matter how "unconstrained", 
cannot create the shape of a society. Debate, argument, logic, and 
discussion all require a starting-point, the prime unmoved mover of 
discourse. Words cannot provide this, but the shaping power ofform can. 
Words thus are secondary phenomenon in contradistinction to forms. 
Indeed words possess their greatest force when they are organised as forms 
- when they appear as genres of philosophy or science, or as novel or 
libretto, rhetoric or drama. Societies likewise acquire their efficacy and 
their lucid sense because they are organised as forms - as tribal, feudal, 
capitalist, or bureaucratic types. Forms rise and fall, gain impetus and lose 
force. Each genre, type or form is irreducible to any other. Feudalism does 
not produce capitalism. The chronicle does not produce the novel. 
The creation of these forms is an imaginative act. Imagination relies on 
individual and social capacities to mobilise abstract - schematic - media. 
Such media generate patterns. Such patterns shape bodily, kinetic, physical, 
aural, visual and other materials - including words. Thus it is rhyme 
schemas, not words, that elicit textual shapes. A word can give a name to a 
shape, but it can't posit a shape. Names without rhymes or other schemata 
are like colours without a painter's intuition of the contrastive 
complementarities of the colour wheel. They can't order the divergent 
materials, whether of colour or language, and tum them into lucid 
structures. 
Phusis 
Castoriadis was always tempted by the notion that forms were created "out 
of nothing"- "figuration figuring itself, starting from nothing".31 No matter 
how much he denied it, this was a romantic-existential theology of creation. 
Much more interesting though than the idea of creation out of nothing was 
the later Castoriadis' recuperation of the Greek idea of phusis as the engine 
of creation.32 If we think about creation as an act of phusis, it gives us a 
31 Castoriadis, The lmagmary Jnstitutron of Society, p. 300. 
32 Castoriadis wavered in hts attitude to phusJS. In "PhuslS and Autonomy" [1986), he had it moving of its 
own accord to create social forms. This indicated that, in a strong sense, society had a nature-an 
encompassing ordering that generated social forms. The problem is that he also held that societies closest 
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way of thinking about the creation of objects, not least of all social objects, 
as both "other" (i.e. as not derivative) but also as not created "out of 
nothing". 
Castoriadis described phusis perfectly. It is nature pushing-toward-
giving-itself-form.33 Phusis is the irresistible push of a being that gives 
itself a form in order to be. Phusis, nature, is self-making or self-
constituting. Phusis forms itself. In doing so, nature moves itself and 
changes itself. The end of its self-movement and self-alteration is the 
positing of form. Phusis moves towards new forms and alters old forms in 
the process. Change, in the strongest sense of that word, is the emergence 
of new forms. 
The nature of anything, including the nature of society, is the irresistible 
push of that being to give itself a form in order to be. Nature forms itself, 
and society organises itself, by giving itself form and by destroying and 
replacing forms that it has previously given itself. Part of this destruction-
creation process is to tum existing forms into the material of creation, to be 
pressed into the service of originating new and distinctly "other" forms. In 
this process- we can speculate- phusis consumes existing forms as matter, 
and reworks them as fundamentally new forms. Thus epic poetry in the 
sense of Homer may become the material for the invention of James 
Joyce's modernist epic novel. The American Founders ransacked history 
for the material they used in the invention of a radical new political form. 
They took material from ancient Greeks and Romans, modem Dutch and 
Anglo-Scottish Whigs, Deists and dissenting Protestants, but reshaped this 
form-turned-material in a massively distinctive manner - creating a sui 
generis form ("only in America"), yet one whose historical materials, or 
more particularly the building blocks of creation that give such materials 
their shape, are quite evident even at a cursory glance. 
We are all familiar with these building blocks. We recognise them. They 
are part of a common stock. These building blocks are the determination of 
form generation. They are implicit in form creation. They are what phusis 
contributes to creation. The building blocks are the commons of all 
creation. They are common to personality, society and external nature. 
These building blocks include the shaping powers of rhythm, harmony, 
equilibrium, and symmetry. There is potentially an infinite array of 
to phusis- i.e. the autonomous societies-were highly reflexive, meaning that social actors looked on the 
laws of those societies as conventions (nomor), not as phusrs. (See, for example, Castoriadis, "The Socmi-
Historical: Mode ofBeing. Problems ofKnowledge" [1987], Philosophy, Polrtrcs, Autonomy, p. 38.) It IS 
perfectly possible to resolve the apparent contradiction between these views, by simply indtcating that 
nonns and laws were secondary manifestations of social form. But in practice Castoriadis couldn't do this 
because he made a strong equation between law and form. 
33 "Phusis and Autonomy" in World m Fragments, pp. 333-334. 
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concrete forms that such media can usher into existence. So even if we 
recognise the building blocks of a form, that form may still be "radically 
different" from what our experience has prepared us for. 
"Radically different" does not mean radically incommensurable in 
Castoriadis' sense. We can see why this is if we again look at the case of 
America. The constitutional balance of power or the workings of market 
equilibrium in the United States are abstract patterns that have a long 
history. Yet many visitors to America today, some five hundred years after 
its first settlement, are still puzzled about how that society works. The 
degree of puzzlement may be seen in the elementary mistakes foreign 
observers habitually make about American institutions and mores. Thus the 
social form of America ends up being both familiar and unfamiliar. 
Outsiders recognise it yet are confused by it. This is not the same as saying, 
as Castoriadis' does, that great social forms are incomparably "other". 
Rather America is both "other" and "the same" - radically distinctive but 
still recognisable. An absolute "other", in contrast, would be 
unrecognisable. 
There are many secondary reasons, but the root reason for the "familiar 
strangeness" of great forms is that the act of imaging that lies at the root of 
the making of social objects draws on a common fund of creation - this 
common wealth is constituted by the tacit organising media of nature 
(hierarchy, rhythm, symmetry, proportionality, equilibrium, and so on). 
These organising powers, when deployed, give rise to an infinite variety of 
explicit forms both social and non-social. These forms are "familiarly 
strange" when compared with each other. They can appear "shockingly 
new", and yet because the human mind (as part of nature) readily 
recognises organising forces like rhythm and symmetry, they remain 
intelligible, coherent, and meaningful - especially once the subjective 
psychological "shock of the new" has worn off. To cite just one simple 
example: both the works of Raphael and Cezanne are constructed around 
fascinating painterly balances but, in each case, these and other organising 
powers deployed by the artists gave rise to very distinct aesthetic forms. In 
Cezanne's case, it took at least fifty years for the forms that he posited to 
be embraced by mainstream art audiences. But no matter how difficult 
these forms were to understand at the beginning, they were in the end 
comprehensible, and so much so that they eventually eclipsed the more 
popular works of his time. 
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Immanence and Legislation 
Bow deliberate - how calculating - is the creation of forms? Joyce and 
Cezanne had a deep, not to say obsessive, idea of what they were doing. 
The same can be said of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. But such 
precocious invention does not take place in a social vacuum. It may 
encounter intense social and political hostility, but that's not the same thing 
as saying that creation is the heroic work of romantic genius. Whether we 
are talking about modernist Irish letters or the forging of the American 
Republic, the greatness of its personalities is invariably matched, indeed 
over-determined, by an upsurge of collective invention. Lonely genius is a 
romantic myth. Creation is a collective process. But this is not to say that it 
operates through the scripts of groups, communities or committees. Quite 
the contrary is the case. 
Creative action flourishes where there are porous social ties.34 Porosity 
exists where psycho-social-linguistic ties are weak. This does not mean that 
all ties between social actors are weak. In fact, creative action occurs under 
conditions of "anti-social sociability" - where weak psycho-social-
linguistic ties are matched by strong ties between strangers mediated by art 
and science.35 This reflects the fact that - at the level of the human 
personality - creation is often marked by a-social traits, but that, at the 
same time, creation operates on the largest social scale imaginable. "Anti-
social" creators cluster in the same periods and places. Kant's formula of 
"unsocial sociability" may be one way of summing up this paradox. 
Whatever name we give to this state of affairs, it is quite enough to suggest 
that creation is not a deliberate process that works through collective social 
discussion - regulated by social norms. Castoriadis rightly called creation 
an anonymous process. The power of social creation is the power of 
nobody.36 It is not individuals but phusis that deploys itself through 
forms.37 
No matter how accomplished he was, Thomas Jefferson didn't "invent" 
America. He quite happily attributed that invention to nature. Jefferson 
knew that the "balance of powers" and other devices of the new republic 
were, at a deep tacit level, copies of phusis - brilliant copies, 
unprecedented copies, paradoxical copies but still copies. What applies to 
politics also applies to art. Cezanne was exceptionally gifted but his ability 
to render the cubic-like structures of nature in two-dimensional planes was 
an imitation of nature's forms in the same way that Raphael's use of 
34 Peter Murphy, "Knowledge Capitalism", Thesis Eleven 81 (2005). 
35 Peter Murphy, "Architectonics" in Peter Murphy and Johann Amason (eds), Agon, Logos, Polis 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001), pp 207-232. 
36 "Power, Politics, Autonomy" in Ph1losophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 150. 
37 "Power, Politics, Autonomy'' in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 147. 
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perspective was. Look at great painting and you'll see nature's geometry. 
Look at a great society, and you'll see the same- a balance of powers, a 
hierarchy, a harmony, a field of coordinate relationships, or some such 
patternleidos around which it is constructed. 
Castoriadis perpetrated a curious contradiction. He insisted (rightly) that 
discursive reason did not create social forms - but he still shared the 
intellectual prejudice in favour of critical discourse. He thought that the 
handful of societies in which form generation had become sistemic and 
recurrent were characterised by cultures of critical discourse. 3 Yet it was 
not critical discourse but constructive ability that made Jefferson, Madison, 
Adams and the other American "founders" able to act as mediators coaxing 
the tacit media of creation into explicit form. Linguistic acts - whether they 
be prophecies, bureaucratic prescriptions, tokens of mutual understanding, 
unlimited questioning or unconstrained discourse - don't explain this 
phenomenon. If anything these acts end up being reasons for the enervation 
of creation, not vice versa. They foster illusions of creation. 
Despite this, most societies in most paces and times have an aversion to 
weak psycho-social-linguistic ties. Their self-appointed representatives are 
forever complaining about the "absence of community" incumbent upon 
such weak ties. Castoriadis tirelessly pointed out that the vast majority of 
societies in history have attributed creation of all kinds to extra-social or 
transcendent forces ("This is the work of Allah."). It may very well be that 
this is a compensation for the weak power of social scripts. One of the 
curious things about language is that it is constantly in need of support. 
Often when we use a proposition we feel a need to "justify" or "explain" 
ourselves. The weaker the script is, the more the author or speaker goes on 
and on. Transcendent authority for speech thus is very handy. It gives the 
illusion of being able to bring speech to a conclusion -just as the parent in 
response to the child's incessant "why?" says "that's just the way it is". 
Being able to anchor the weak power of social language in an extra-social 
language - the commandment of God, for example - seemingly negates 
this weakness. This also has the effect of turning later acts of human 
creation either into the work of heretics or into "reruns" of some mythical 
golden age when social actors obeyed "the transcendent word". 
18 Typical of this are statements such as "the rise of unlimited interrogation creates a new socio-historical 
eidos" ("Power, Politics, Autonomy'', Ph1losoplry, Politics, Autonomy, p. 163), "Greece is the first soc1ety 
where we find the explicit questioning of the mstituted collective representation of the world"; "the 
question of what a just law is, what justice is-what the 'proper' institution of society is-opens up as a 
genume, that is, interminable, question" ("The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy" [1982-1983], 
Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, pp. 102, p. 114), "politics, such as it was created by the Greeks, amounts 
to the explicit putting into question of the established institution of society" ("Power, Politics, 
Autonomy", Philosophy, Polit1cs, Autonomy, p. 159). 
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·But no matter what fatwas are issued in the name of God, these cannot 
.guarantee the certainty of language. Doubt plagues the religious mind. This 
. nas two consequences. Some people will conclude that all there is, is 
.nothing. Others will conclude that only violence can back up "the word". 
Often these two positions coincide in the one person. Trading in the 
transcendent word for the secular word does nothing to get rid of the 
weakness oflanguage. In fact it often only exacerbates it. We see this in the 
case of modem intellectuals who try to write the scripts of secular 
sacieties.39 These scripts are often very unconvincing, especially when they 
rely on the premise "if we, the righteous, say it is so, it must be true". 
Hence we end up with the ground-less authority of the modem intellectual 
who loves to tell others what to do, and the massive resistance of those 
others to such authority-less and frequently ridiculous injunctions. Mostly 
nobody cares what the intellectuals say, but that doesn't stop them saying it 
with a dogmatism that they imagine to be "critical and reflexive". This 
vicious circle somehow seems built into the nature of language - and its 
impossible quest for a surety it can never attain. 
The weakness of language stands in sharp contrast to the strength of 
images - what we might call the strong iconography of nature. It is its 
understanding of this that sets Castoriadis' social philosophy apart. 
Noteworthy in particular is the role he ascribes to the figure or ikon. There 
is a latent and subtle Byzantine quality about this.40 It has strong echoes of 
neo-Platonism.41 Similarly, Castoriadis' understanding of creation as phusis 
39 As Agnes Heller observed, in the twentieth century "the task of creating meaningful world-views" 
increasingly became "the prerogative of professionals". Heller, The Power of Shame. A Ratwnal 
Perspective (London: Routledge, 1985), p. 181. 
4° Castoriadis is not alone in this. A Byzantine neo-Platonism permeates the extraordinary cinema of Theo 
Angelopoulos. In Angelopoulos' case, the comparison is often made between his films and the "Orthodox 
tradition of icon painting". See Andrew Horton, Thea Angelopoulos A Cinema ojContemplat1on 
(Princeton: Princeton Umversity Press, 1997), p 27. This is perfectly true, though, as also in the case of 
Castoriadis, the iconography of the icon/figure is the visible rendering of invisible figures of form, 
alluding always to the way in which figuration figures itself. What happens at the "point" of creation is 
very difficult to understand, of course. Angelopoulos' ability to induce the contemplative stillness of the 
moving picture is a remarkable imagining of the time out of mind of creation, in which-through the 
iconic moment-past, present and future is suspended, just like "the suspended step of the stork" (the title 
ofAngelopoulos' great 1991 film). 
41 Plotinus emphasised the non-discursive nature of the intellect-paramount in its contemplation of 
beauty and order. See, for example, the Eighth Tractate ofPlotinus' The Enneads (London: Penguin, 
1991). As part of that discussion, Plotinus (pp. 416-417) draws a very revealing analogy between the 
intellect and archaic Egyptian picture language. ''Similarly, as it seems to me, the wise of Egypt-
whether in precise knowledge or by the prompting of nature-indicated the truth where, in their effort 
toward philosophical statement, they left aside the writing-forms that take in the detail of words and 
sentences-those characters that represent sounds and convey the propositions of meaning-and drew 
pictures instead, engraving in the temple inscriptions a separate image for every separate item: thus they 
exhibited the absence of discursiveness in the Intellectual Realm. For each manifestation of knowledge 
and wisdom is a distinct image, an object in itself, an immediate unity, not an aggregate of discursive 
reasoning and detailed willing." 
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takes him very close to the immanent cosmology of the Stoics. A model of 
imagistic immanence in opposition to scriptive legislation makes good 
sense. Creation, on any level, is not the fruit of deliberate linguistic acts -
be it the acts of a legislator God or a planning committee. To think it is 
only encourages the delusions of those political intellectuals who produce 
endless volumes of "writings", usually unreadable, which invariably 
recommend single-minded action based on pitiless consistency with 
discursive principles. Whether these principles happen to be divine 
commandments or foundation-less assertions of moral righteousness makes 
little difference. Without exception, this uncompromising consistency ends 
in poisonous deeds or murderous conclusions. Discursive principles by 
their nature exclude contradictory statements. But the world, the ordered 
world, is not logically consistent. Thus when decent politics is defined as 
the art of compromise, the following is meant: any politics that is not mad 
or empty is like iconic art. It reconciles contradictions by deploying the 
silent connective powers of phusis. Beauty, not logic, is the enemy of 
tyranny. What erases arbitrary and despotic inconsistency from human 
actions is grace. Consistency in action models itself on the smooth, lucid, 
flowing - in a word, graceful - quality of the beautiful image. In contrast, 
the fanatics' desire for the world to be consistent with discursive principles 
- a result of propositional language pushed beyond its proper limits - is 
exceedingly destructive and results in arbitrary, despotic and irrational 
deeds. The end result of fanatical rationalism in love with discursive 
principles is the creation of chaos, not the kosmos or pattern of creation. 
The attempt to "restore" the world or re-make the world "anew" - by 
bringing it in line with discursive principles - has repeatedly failed. The 
result often has been horrible conflagration. This has not, however, stopped 
intellectuals from touting ever newer, more absurd, and crueller scripts. In 
contrast to this destructive impulse, a handful of societies in history have 
found ways of turning collective social creation into a permanent and 
constructive process. The evidence for this is continuing high levels of 
artistic, scientific, political, economic and technological creativity in these 
societies over sustained periods, combined with manifestly high levels of 
social well-being and political happiness. 
To have institutionalised creativity in such a manner may once have 
been considered good fortune but nothing more. Since around 1820, 
however, social success - measured in terms of social wellbeing - has 
become massively linked to permanent innovation in the arts and 
humanities, and in science and technology. A society that exempts itself 
from the collective processes of creation - and some do quite wilfully in 
the name of Allah, master or tribe - now live a kind of social death that has 
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jJQ historical precedent. The only escape from this living social death is to 
~a way of instituting "a regime of permanent innovation". Such a social 
'dhier should not be mistaken for a regime of change, fashion or vogue. 
ttither it is a regime of persistent form creation. Its reason for being is the 
-creation of shapes, figures, types, and genres. 
- ~ Such persistence should not be confused with Castoriadis' favourite 
'tmage of a magma flow- the continual spewing forth of creative acts from 
the collective and individual radical imagination. This image suggests that 
every moment of existence is creation, which is implausible. Doubtless, 
·tow-level background creation is pervasive in human experience. Endless 
incipient forms appear and as quickly disappear for want of recognition or 
viability. A kind of creative action is implicated in the replication, 
adaptation, imitation and translation of existing forms. But even the most 
creative society doesn't produce the kinds of strong forms that re-define the 
shape of society without enormous difficulty. One of the greatest of these 
difficulties is the question of stability - the persistence of forms in 
existence. Castoriadis was right to say that forms emerge in time, but Plato 
was also right to say that forms defy time. 
Time has a penchant for destruction. It erodes and destroys forms - not 
least incipient forms. Time mocks weak forms. Heteronomy is one of the 
great defences against destructive time. It defends social and existential 
forms by precluding further experimentation in form-making. This regime 
of protection, we know, has its own destructiveness built into it. To avoid 
the petrifaction of tradition, autonomous societies thus dispense with 
external authorities. Yet, in order to stabilise themselves, they have to deal 
with the dual problem of persistence. This is the problem of how to 
combine ongoing experimentation in form-making with the durability of 
forms thereby created. If this problem is not satisfactorily dealt with, 
creation becomes indistinguishable from chaos. Castoriadis suggested 
many times that self-limitation was the way that autonomous societies 
stabilised themselves. Self-limitation suggests a society that can draw its 
own boundaries. This is a society that, knowingly, gives itself shape. This 
is plausible. It is certainly more plausible than the arguments of the modem 
apostles of destructive creation who proselytise change for its own sake. 
Creation-as-destruction and creation-as-change are indifferent to the form-
endowing quality that lies at the heart of any great creation, and to the 
defiance of time by forms so created. 
For this reason, I have intentionally used the phrase "a regime of 
permanent innovation" to make a point. Prima facie, the phrase sounds like 
a rationalist nightmare. It evokes a society run by a committee of 
busybodies who want to change things "for the better" - meaning, for the 
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sake of change itself. Here we see the classic confusion of time's onward 
march with creation - the equation of the new with the formative. Nothing 
is more ridiculous than this. Correspondingly, there is good reason to think 
that creation at the deepest level is not "deliberate". It cannot be prescribed 
in a policy document or a master plan. Yet it can be understood. It does 
have patterns. Still, all the buzz-words in the world contribute nothing to its 
genesis. A large part of the reason for this is that the genesis of forms is not 
discursive. Communicative reason follows form. It does not precede it. 
Form emerges in non-discursive figures, shapes and patterns. 
Time Out Of Mind 
If Castoriadis is right, society (in the singular) creates societies (in the 
plural). Society in the singular is self-altering. It acts through history, 
positing social forms. Each form is exceptional; each is radically "other". 
This idea compares in interesting ways with the model developed by the 
great Swiss historian Jacob Burkhardt. Burkhardt proposed that the birth of 
social forms is closely connected with the renaissance or re-birth of forms. 
At first glance it would seem that Castoriadis' idea of the radical 
emergence of social forms and Burkhardt's notion of the re-emergence of 
forms are totally at odds. However, as we know, things are often not what 
they first appear to be. In fact there is a lot of common ground between 
Burkhardt's and Castoriadis' ideas. If there weren't, there would be no way 
to explain Castoriadis' persistent reference to what he called "Greco-
Westem" societies. That hyphenated concept clearly suggests that 
emergence involves some kind of re-emergence. But what kind? - that's 
the question. 
Castoriadis used the phrase "Greco-Western societies" as a synonym for 
creative societies.42 In a loose empirical sense, he was right. The vast 
majority of high-achieving human creation is the product of this band of 
societies. But the term "Greco-Western" is also misleading. Without 
question, creation clusters in certain times and places. "Greek antiquity" is 
foremost among these. Athens produced a staggering intellectual legacy 
with what was by modem standards a modest population of some 150,000 
Athenians (about a third ofthem citizens), 100,000 slaves, and 50,000 alien 
residents. In contrast, it is not so clear that "the modem West" is as useful a 
designator of peak creation as "Greek antiquity". Take the case Burkhardt's 
home city of Basel. Like Athens, nineteenth-century Basel had a modest, if 
42 On the centrality of Greco-Western societies in creative action, see ''Phuszs and Autonomy" in World in 
Fragments, p. 339; "Culture in a Democratic Society" in The Castoriad1s Reader, p. 345; and "The 
Social-Historical: Mode of Being, Problems of Knowledge" (p. 37) and "Power, Politics, Autonomy" (p. 
144) in Philosophy, Polltzcs, Autonomy. 
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, -rapidly gro~g, pop.ulation and. its citizen rulers made up about a thir~ of 
tJie populatton. Desptte the fact 1t was no London or Berhn, the Basel ctty-
. state domiciled not just Burkhardt, who was probably the greatest historian 
of the nineteenth century, but also Nietzsche, the greatest philosopher of 
that century.43 That's quite an achievement. Yet this kind of extraordinary 
creative attainment is by no means evenly distributed across the West. 
Indeed it is much less evenly distributed across the West than serious 
accomplishment was evenly distributed amongst the hundreds of ancient 
Greek city-states. 
In simple terms, the West is a bit of misnomer. Basel in the nineteenth 
century may have been a shining place, but it was so arguably because it 
was a major portal city on the Rhine and sat at the apex of one of a handful 
of "creative inland islands" in Europe - in this case, the triangular area of 
Baden-Wfuttemberg bounded by the Rhine and Danube Rivers that has 
Stuttgart at its centre. If we compare such "creative inland islands" with the 
rest of Western Europe, we find that many of the other regions of Europe 
(past and present) are lacklustre, backward, or downright lethargic by 
comparison. 
It is notable today that those non-Western societies that show distinct if 
still inconclusive signs of joining the company of the systemic form-
generating societies are principally the island, archipelago, peninsula, and 
coastal societies of East Asia- Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
the South Coast of China, and Singapore.44 There is an interesting parallel 
between this littoral cluster and the first, second, third, fourth and fifth-
hand institutionalisations of intensive creation. The first institutionalisation 
occurred in the ancient Mediterranean, the second in the late-medieval and 
Renaissance Mediterranean, the third around the North Sea and Baltic rim 
of Europe, the fourth in the riverine arteries of Western Europe, and the 
fifth in the littoral powerhouses of the Australasian and North American 
settler societies. 
In the annals of human creation, without question, the first 
institutionalisation of intensive creation - the Greek breakthrough - was 
astonishing. Castoriadis' instinct always was to link the concept of 
"Western modernity" to the peculiar space-time of"Greek antiquity". Even 
if we replace "Western modernity" with the notion of "littoral modernity", 
which I think is an empirically stronger concept, there remains no question 
that there are, and there remain, extraordinary parallels between the antique 
and modem cases. Yet what exactly such parallels are, and what they mean, 
43 And also Bachofen and Overbeck. 
44 These states have done so under the impetus of various kinds of Anglo-American cooperation, 
hegemony, or incitement--sometimes welcomed and sometimes not. 
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is more difficult to specify. Castoriadis proceeded to draw these parallels 
with great care. This is because any talk of the twinning of "antiquity and 
modernity", and of the collusion of "Greeks and Moderns", has obvious 
risks. One is that it plays out as nothing more than a kind of nostalgia - in 
short: a backward-looking Hellenism. Whatever criticisms might be 
directed at Castoriadis' work, there is nothing "backward-looking" in it. 
Yet his work does not belong to the "forward-looking" progressive genre 
either. Castoriadis was aware that backward- and forward-looking senses of 
time were personal or psychological in nature - and that creative "works 
and objects" redolent with marks of this psychological time never outlive 
their authors' death. For anyone, like Castoriadis, interested in explaining 
the most adventurous acts of creation, this was important to note. Time is 
the ultimate judge of these acts, and few things survive time's withering 
judgment. 
In his theory of creation, we see Castoriadis carefully demarcate the 
temporal schemata of "acts of creation" from the subjective-psychological 
time of memory, attention, and expectation. This, incidentally, is not an 
easy thing to do. Memory, attention, and expectation are normally the way 
that we apprehend time.45 Time, in the three dimensions of retention, 
attention and protention, is categorical for the human mind. These three 
dimensions are fundamental to what Castoriadis, after Augustine, called the 
stretching of the mind- the distento animi.46 This animus of the mind is 
capable of three activities or postures. It remembers, it pays attention, and it 
expects. All of these are subjective approaches to time. It is individual 
human subjects who remember, attend, and anticipate. Human beings of 
course try to project subjective time schemas onto institutions. They talk, 
analogously, of "institutional memory" or "collective expectations". 
Sometimes there is a rough correspondence between subjective time and 
group expectation or archival memory. But it is only a very rough 
approximation. 
What Castoriadis does that is interesting is to suggest that the most 
significant social acts of creation are not played out in subjective time. 
They are not enacted through memory, attention, or anticipation. What he 
raises, correspondingly, is the idea that there is a common or public time-
an ontological time dependent neither on recollection, interest, nor promise. 
What kind of time is this? It is the time of anonymous creation. This is the 
kind of creation that escapes being over-determined by human subjectivity. 
The footprint of subjectivity makes most speeches, novels, paintings and 
melodies read, sound or look excruciating once they are placed out of their 
45 "Time and Creation" in World m Fragments, pp. 379-383. 
46 "Time and Creation" in World m Fragments, pp. 380-381. 
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"time. In contrast, non-subjective time is a time outside of mind - it is not 
the kind of time through which the human mind is "stretched" forwards, 
downwards or backwards. Mostly we inhabit this personal-psychological 
·time of"stretching"- but not always. Sometimes we experience time out of 
mind. We do so when we encounter a "classic". This happens, for example, 
when we come across an artwork or a social object that may have been 
produced in time but that is not easily classifiable as an object of memory, 
attention or expectation. We are unsure in fact whether it belongs to the 
past, the present, or the future. 47 
Anyone who builds a social philosophy on conceptual pairs, like 
"ancients and moderns" or "Greece and the West", risks producing a 
memory-saturated theory of society. This is work that is elegiac, sorrowful, 
. funereal, or grief-stricken. Nostalgia is a paradigm instance of such 
memorial time. It is time filled with memories of loss. Such loss can be 
projected onto a world-historical stage. The attempt to find redemption 
through the past is invariably destructive. Far from being enamoured with 
the past - with "what was" - Castoriadis, if anything, was "guilty" of the 
opposite. He persistently argued that the social creation of forms was un-
determined. His view was that maximal form creation occurred "out of 
nothing". Neither the past, nor the present, could logically be the causal 
determinant of any future form that was "unprecedented" in the strong 
sense of that word. 
This thesis profoundly affected Castoriadis' understanding of the 
relationship of "Greeks and Moderns". He saw them as a pair but reiterated 
on many occasions that the link between the ancient polis and the modern 
West was non-casual. Greek antiquity did not "produce" the West. Rather it 
was the case that Greek and Western societies coincidentally shared a 
massive capacity for reflexivity. They were not causally or genetically 
related, but they had an uncanny family resemblance. Both were defined by 
their readiness for self-interrogation, self-critique, and internal dissent. 
These societies regularly questioned their own laws. They were not in thrall 
to extra-social validation. They critiqued their own presuppositions, axioms 
47 Exactly the same applies to any kind of maximal creation. Works of maximal creation are not revivals 
They are not contemporary chic. They are not millenarian-"about to be born". It is this bracketing of 
subjective time incidentally that makes Castoriadis' own work a "classic". It transcends his personal 
identification with the hypertensive "now" moment of1968 and the social movements of the 1960s. It 
escapes the millenarian expectation of"coming into being" that periodically surfaces in his work. He 
quells his own fascinated expectation with "what is to come" with a deep respect for great social forms. 
Finally-and not least because of his abiding and deep admiration for great forms-his is a body of work 
that never looks back, with nostalgia, at past social achievements. Castoriadis is a Greek thinker par 
excellence but not ever a sentimentalist. 
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and foundations. They were able to suspend their most basic criteria and 
rules on their own recognisance.48 
While there is some truth in this, reflexivity - on whatever scale - is not 
sufficient to explain the emergence of forms. Critique is a function of 
words, and words, even if they are critical words, play a remarkably low-
level role in acts of creation. Words come after the fact of creation. They 
are ciphers for what we already know, not for new knowledge. Words at 
most offer the possibility of being syllogistically deducted from discursive 
principles. As Castoriadis often noted, such communicative reason cannot 
explain Europe's transition from agrarian feudalism to civic capitalism, the 
Roman and American replacement of kingship with republicanism, or the 
Greek and Western replacement of aristocracy with democracy. Nobody 
deduced the American Revolution or England's Glorious Revolution. 
Indeed large-scale attempts at social deduction have invariably led to 
terrorism and the triumph of chaos over cosmos. The French Revolution 
established the modem template for this. It confused the violent negation of 
form with the radical emergence of form. The intellectuals who devised 
Japan's Shinto fascism or Syrian-Iraq-Lebanese Baathist fascism or the 
strains of homicidal suicidal totalitarian feudal Islamism all appealed to 
discursive principles whose logic led directly into the thanatocratic abyss. 
Principles without form, words without figuration, quickly become an 
incitement to social destruction because of their inherent chaotic drive. 
They portend destruction without creation. 
As Castoriadis constantly reiterated, creation is a function of form -
and, as the very idea of "form" suggests, creation is figurative not 
linguistic. The medium of the act of creation is figure, shape, and pattern. 
There may be something built into the nature of the cosmos - into the 
nature of nature, or the nature of being - that conditions this. There are 
figures, shapes, and patterns (e.g. symmetries, scales, and rhythms) built 
into the building blocks of nature (e.g. super strings). The human mind and 
human society draw freely and recursively on these in form creation. In this 
sense, form follows nature. Reflexivity can amplify form - it can focus 
attention on it. It can link subjective and ontological time. But reflexivity 
cannot in itself create form. 
Nature, phusis, is the key to understanding what Burkhardt meant when 
he talked about the renaissance of social forms. We all know that the cities 
of the Italian Renaissance "re-discovered antiquity". Curiously, in doing so, 
they also forged an ebullient type of modernity. Their re-search or re-
discovery of the past produced a social form that was not in any sense a 
shallow imitation. This was because what the very inventive inhabitants of 
48 Castoriadis, "Log1c, Imagination, Reflection" [1988-1992], World m Fragments, pp. 267-268. 
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• great Renaissance cities did was not "re-dis~over the past". in the sense 
j':"where we have come from" .b~t rather dtscover (and dtscover they 
jted} societies (Greco-Roman soctetles) that had a powerful sense offo~. 
!What made the Romans secondary to the Greeks, and the Itahan 
J:enrussance secondary to the Romans and the Greeks, was not a feeble 
(feSire of one to copy the other as a child traces the outline of a picture it 
ilikes, but rather a deep desire to replicate what happens in only a very few 
~ial times and places- namely, an incredible upsurge of form. Mimesis 
is the force that drives such upsurges. But it is the mimesis of phusis, and 
·:er. society's engagement with the time of mind, rather than any lame 
.j-epetition of what has come before. When Einstein taught himself 
!nathematics using Euclid's handbook, he did not think that geometry 
'ended with Euclid .• What he was developing was a strong sense of 
: mathematical form. Euclid was a "classic" for Einstein in the same sense 
:that Europe's last great period of form-giving the era of Braque, 
Stravinsky, Cavafy, Mondrian, and Minkowski - will one day be a 
~classic" period for a future epoch. 
· From this standpoint, Castoriadis' assertion that socio-historical worlds 
are self-contained, and irreducible to each other, is both right and wrong. It 
is perfectly true that French Revolutionary attempts to duplicate Greek and 
. Roman rhetoric, festivals, funeral ceremonies, and names were a silly 
pantomime. They - notably - had no impact on the revolutionary laws of 
the period.49 While the effects of the French Revolution were massive, its 
Greco-Roman self-understanding was superficial - at least measured by its 
outcomes, which were remarkably unstable. From the time of the 
Revolution to the Republic of de Gaulle, France suffered persistent regime 
crises and collapses. Contrast this with the Italian Renaissance and the 
American Revolution. The Italian city-states certainly had their share of 
atrocious government, but, like a lot of the most creative states, a powerful 
underlying sense of self-organisation neutralised the corrupting effects of 
much of this. Italian anarchy was not lethal. While in the American case, 
the Greco-Roman tradition produced a much more visible sense of order in 
government- synonymous with long-term stability and development. 
Either way, and in both cases, Greek and Roman models served as 
instructive examples of the way in which some societies are able to draw 
on the common wealth of form-generating media, allowing them to enact 
socio-historical world-making in ontological time. What explains the 
massive constructive surge of the great Renaissance cities and the 
American Revolution was their collective capacity to engage time out of 
49 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, "The Place of Greece in the Imaginary Representations of the Men of the 
Revolution" in Pol1t1cs Anc1ent and Modern (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995). 
Culture & Memory. Special Issue of Modem Greek Studies (Australia and New Zealand) 2006: 33 
Peter Murphy, The Pattern of Creation 
mind. This was time out of mind in the sense that it was not the time of 
past, present or future. It was an ontological time in which the ancient 
appeared to be contemporary, and the contemporary looked and felt 
ancient. Human beings are born, and they live, in the subjective time of 
regret, awareness and expectation. This is an inescapable part of the human 
condition. However, human beings are also drawn to another kind of time. 
This time is timeless. Everyone has intuitions of it. Deja vu is an uncanny 
psychological version of it. Plato's notion of forms that exist outside the 
flux of ordinary social or personal time is a great philosophical treatment of 
this timeless time- just as Cezanne's definition of nature as composed of 
cones and cylinders is a great aesthetic invocation of it. What Cezanne was 
getting at was that an artwork that is radically un-determined by previous 
artworks is nonetheless determined by the artist's encounter with forms 
whose time is ontological, not personal. The forms of a Cezanne painting 
are unmistakable. They can be imitated but they are not an imitation of 
another artist's work. Nonetheless, they are mimetic. The paradox is that 
they are a radiant imitation, and yet they are not pedestrian copies. They are 
a mimesis of phusis, not a copy of existing artworks. 
What applies to the great artist also applies to great societies. Some 
societies, usually for short historical periods, encourage excursions into 
ontological time. The importance of the artistic masterpieces of these 
societies resounds across all times and periods. The forms that constitute 
the skeletons of these masterpieces are not "new", are not "old", and are 
not "now". They evade entirely the categories of subjective time. 
Ontological time instead compounds subjective time into the time of a 
"new order of the ages". This time and its forms are not exhausted -nor are 
they even particularly well represented - in discursive thought and speech. 
The normal "train" of argument and discussion finds it difficult to extricate 
itself from the force of memory, or from the pregnant now, or from hope 
and expectation. Those extensions of the human mind, after all, are keys to 
the ordinary apprehension of time. We find it difficult, though not 
impossible, to bracket memory, attention, and hope. Such bracketing 
requires an exceptional toughness of mind. 
Form creation - represented by a "new order of the ages" - is not 
discursive. Discursive thought or communicative reasoning relies on the 
law of non-contradiction. If what I say is consistent, then it is true. Chains 
of reasoning are valid if the major and minor premises, and the conclusion, 
of the reasoning are consistent. If witches are bad, and supporters of policy 
Y are political witches, then witch-hunting these supporters is legitimate. 
Or, as Hegel once put it, there are many good reasons for doing bad things. 
Forms, in contrast, are composed out of contradictions. They are ruled by 
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:.J8w of contradiction. Forms are unions of opposites. They meld master 
~·.servant, sovereign and subject, hot and cold, hard and soft, steel and 
5". Forms unite such divergent parts through pattern media. Patterns are 
~Ordered- and orde~ing - co~lescen~e of contra~ts. Commonplace forms 
-·organise patterns mclude hierarchies, harmomes, scales, rhythms, and 
~ons: This is not .to sugg~st that the soci.al appropriation of forms is 
~ays bemgn. Dark, v10lent, dissonant, crus~mg forms that tum !owards 
:;tbfmlessness are as common as elegant, beautiful forms. Human bemgs are 
-ely fascinated by the dissolution, ruin, and meltdown of forms as by 
tgeir creation through renaissance. 50 
•· · The renaissance of forms occurs principally through images - not 
·ttiscussions. The renaissance of forms is the intense but rarely lasting 
:encounter of a society with ontological time. The most common images 
~associated with the invention of social forms are conceived out of visual-
:diagrammatical, rhythmic-aural and kinetic-plastic patterns. Words can be 
material for harmonies, scales, and for rhythmic explorations, but social 
. invention as opposed to social dissemination rarely relies on the discursive 
train of thought but rather on the figurative images of the imagination, 
which, in their tum, rely on universal form-hatching media like 
symmetries, scales, and rhythms. 
Linguistic genres such as stories and dramas are relatively late-arriving 
· evolutionary additions to this human repertoire of order-making - and 
notably what the masterpieces of these genres do is to transform subjective 
time into the time of epic, tragedy, and comedy. They tum human 
expectation into destiny, necessity, or comic reversal.51 Memory, attention 
and expectation are social crutches - unavoidable but at times unhelpful. 
Castoriadis was thus right to stress the importance of tragedy in the first 
great reflexive upsurge of human creativity - the Greek polis. The polis 
was fuelled by the most unsparing inquiry into the phusis of personality, 
society, and cosmos. This emerged in various ways, but no more 
enduringly than in its epic song, its tragic drama, and its comedy. All 
pointed beyond the human vanity that subjects create social worlds out of 
their hopes and memories into the deep ontological layers where society 
and phusis meet and where creation unfolds. 
5° Castoriadis, in "The Institution of Society and Religion" in World m Fragments, observed that social 
fonns ate stretched rather thinly over the abyss of chaos and groundlessness. There is a nihilistic streak in 
the human psyche that is fascinated by the abyss, and its thanatocratic nature. Social dissolution and 
death-the death of fonns-is often interpreted as a kind of dark beauty that attracts as much as the lucid 
beauty of ascendant forms On this, see Peter Murphy, Civic Justice· From Ancient Greece to the Modern 
World, chapter eight. 
51 Wit is arguably the highest form of creation in the sense that it rests entirely on undoing of 
expectation--a mode of subjective time--through turning what we expect into its opposite 
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The Crucible of the City 
We can be confident that collective creation does exist because we know 
that a handful of societies in a number of specific times and places have 
engaged in massive acts of creation and re-creation for extended periods of 
time. In other social times and places, this simply hasn't happened. So, if 
collective creation exists, how can we explain it? It is no good saying that 
such societies are an aggregate of individual creative personalities. As 
Castoriadis rightly insisted, personalities lean on their society. What seems 
to be the case is that some societies are very hospitable to creative 
personalities- the cities of the Italian Renaissance are a classic example. In 
talking about Greco-Western societies, Castoriadis most often refers to the 
"ancient polis" or the "burgher city" as their spring. 52 This is an important 
observation. The city is the most important condition of human creation. It 
is not the only condition of human creation but it is the most crucial one. 
All ofthe great moments of Greco-Western creation are centred on specific 
cities: Athens, Rome, Venice, Florence, Amsterdam, London, New York, 
Chicago, San Francisco among them. 
Why is the city, the polis, so important? In a circular sense, we can say 
that in certain times and places the city is unusually hospitable to creative 
personalities. It accommodates their traits. But why is this so? One of the 
most powerful reasons is that the city, like the imagination, is a figurative-
aural-plastic medium. All human society begins with the making of marks 
on the earth. Eventually this evolves into the kind of spiritual geometry that 
was achieved during the Greek breakthrough - and that is the most potent 
recurring sign of concentrated creative human achievement. The city is the 
most intensive expression of the work of humankind in creating an artificial 
environment for itself - be it a track, a field, or a street. The city is 
primarily defined not by words or language or textual signs but by 
architectonic forms, distributed networks, social geometries, and relational 
schemas. It is through such media that societies forge a union of opposites. 
What are logical contradictions from the standpoint of discursive language 
are harmonies and symmetries in sound and figure and touch. 
We can give the name of the commons to these collective patterns. The 
commons is the primary medium for the imaging activity of the individual 
mind. Minds imag(in)e forms. Mainly these are familiar forms. They are 
replicated and adapted from what we see and hear and feel around us. But 
some, a much smaller number, are unfamiliar - or rather more exactly they 
are uncannily familiar. They are replicated fromphusis. They are modelled 
52 See, e.g., "The Movements of the Sixties" [1986] in World m Fragments, p. 56; "The Crisis of Culture 
and the State" [1986] in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy, p. 230. 
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~the forms of nature that the nous tacitly, already, always recognises. 
=jbese forms are both unfamiliar and yet somehow very familiar. Some of 
~e "unfamiliar familiar" forms are eventually embodied in the city. They 
inSpire further mental imaging. The figures of the city correct for the 
idiosyncrasies of the individual mind. The forms of the city are 
:.(qecessarily) coll_e~tive. The images that they inspire are pre-disposed to 
·collective recogmtwn. 
· .. If that is so, then why are most cities creative dead-waters? In the last 
two centuries, much of the human population has moved into urban areas. 
BUt in the main, with very few exceptions, a small number of Western 
cities have remained overwhelmingly - and measurably - the dominant 
·creative centres. At the first level, the answer is that only some cities 
develop strong architectonic forms. This is not just a matter of wealth, but 
of ambition and instinct as well. On a deeper level, this is because only a 
very few cities develop as open systems. This is a crucial condition of 
pennanent form creation - even if it is not the only condition. 
In most cases, the principal sites of collective creation have been 
stranger cities - cities filled with aliens, visitors, travellers, exiles, 
migrants, settlers, and people from elsewhere. The enigmatic case of 
twentieth-century Japan - a very ethnocentric society - provides a partial 
exception to this proposition. But it is an exception that proves the rule -
for the Japanese attempt to innovate in the sense of "form-create'' under 
conditions of social closure reaped a terrible price. The Japanese resort to 
the use of scripts, notably the script of anti-Western nationalist ideology, to 
steer a society struggling to reconcile "change and tradition", proved 
catastrophic. The anti-Western Shinto fascism of Japan's inter-war period 
ended in complete disaster. Yet, as with other littoral and seaboard 
societies, Japan is a society where form-innovation has reached significant 
levels. Notably, the key driver of this achievement has been non-discursive 
aesthetics - for example miniaturising arts - and mathematics. But there 
always remains the question of how much aesthetic power alone, without 
the collusion of strangers, can sustain high-level creation? 
A classic example of the importance of the stranger is Burkhardt's 
Basel. They may have been perpetually excluded from Basel citizenship, 
but Protestant refugees from France, Flanders and Italy, who poured in 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were crucial to the 
development of the industrial base of the city and its long-term success. 
The enduring model of the exo-city is the ancient polis - not least of all 
Athens in the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries.53 In classical Athens, huge 
numbers of resident aliens had a very powerful influence on the character 
53 Peter Murphy, "Architectonics" in Agon, Logos, Polls, pp 207-232. 
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of the city. Why is the stranger city important? It is important because it 
tends to unleash the aural-pictorial-plastic imagination. Such creative 
imagining emerges under conditions of porous social ties. Th~ stran~er. ~ity 
is an ecology of such porous ties. It is the via media ofunsoc1al soctabthty. 
Paradoxically, strong social forms emerge where society is "weak" in the 
sense that its linguistic norms, rules and authority are feeble. Under 
conditions of weak linguistic interaction, figurative schemata, visual 
thinking, musical and plastic-haptic forms come to the fore. This occurs 
because the noise of language is reduced. Opinion, rhetoric, propositional 
judgments, verdicts, and convictions are all treated sceptically. The 
reasoning of debate, which can never escape conventional premises, is set 
aside. Logos and doxa are downplayed along with dogmatic, moralising, 
and righteous assertions. Through the graphical, schematic and pictorial 
media of the imagination, new forms (shapes and figures) emerge. 
Shape implies order - kosmos in contrast to kaos. Everybody has 
experienced the impulse to replace kaos with kosmos when we say: "Let us 
meet where there is a whiteboard. I think more clearly when I can sketch 
things out." Sense can be made out of the fog of a messy situation when we 
can sketch a solution. Just as there is individual and group sketching, there 
is also a social whiteboard. It is not language. Language is not the house of 
being. The house of being - being that pushes towards giving itself form -
is the city. In cities, more than any other social medium, human beings 
outwardly in their external environment) represent aural, visual and haptic 
forms to themselves. Cities allow considerable scope for experimenting 
with new shapes and patterns. Some experiments are idiosyncratic and 
quickly die. Most experiments repeat (with minor differences) what already 
exists. Successful forms by definition are repeated. It is notable just how 
quickly compelling forms are picked up and replicated in cities. While 
repetition is a key aspect of any form creation, it is not repetition per se that 
defines the creative city. It is emergence. Emergence stands on 
contrariness: the capability to unify what is divergent: "out of many, one." 
This is not the negative capability of social critique. It is the "musical" 
capacity to harmonise the discordant. What contrary minds do on an 
individual level, great cities do on a collective level. The city in this sense 
is the site for experiments that turn existing forms into the materials out of 
which new fonns emerge. This poietic activity turns the past into the 
future, memory into expectation, and history into that which is new and 
unexpected. Out of this compounding of time, it creates a "new order of the 
ages". 
Culture & Memory. Special Issue of Modem Greek Studres (Australia and New Zealand) 2006: 38 
Object-Oriented Aesthetics: 
The Legacy of Plato in the 
Philosophy of Art 
Eugenio Benitez 
University of Sydney 
For the products of the arts have their excellence in themselves; 
it is enough, then, that they have these [fine qualities] in some 
way when they have been made. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.4.11 05a27-29 
Aristotle thought that artistic excellence lay entirely in the objects of art. In 
this he was merely stating plainly the view already maintained by his 
predecessor, Plato. Plato himself was not so conservative, however. The 
conception of artistic excellence that preceded him was dynamic, but 
through persistent effort and argument Plato brought about a change of 
focus in aesthetics that has persisted down to the present day. I shall call 
the focus that Plato brought to art "object-oriented aesthetics" and describe 
it as follows: an aesthetics is object-oriented just in case it locates artistic 
excellence entirely in art objects, their objective properties or their 
objective relations. Plato's object-oriented aesthetics is a special case: it 
locates artistic excellence entirely in beauty, which is seen as an objective 
property instantiated in art objects. 
In this paper I will begin by exploring the context in which object-
oriented aesthetics arose. I will set object-oriented aesthetics against 
another focus which I shall call "activity-oriented aesthetics", in which the 
excellence of an artistic production lies in the artist's activity. This activity 
is merely expressed in the finished work, even when the work is 
overwhelmingly admirable. Excellent artistic activity originates and 
persists in the artist's manner, execution and style. 1 Just as there is a special 
1 A product of chance or accident can be beautiful only in an equivocal sense It has the appearance of 
something that might have been fashioned, but it is not artistically beautiful. Similarly, a chance 
arrangement of matter cannot be naturally beautiful, however wondrous it may appear. 
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